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Current law encourages patentees and defendants in a patent
infringement suit to make the most widely varying arguments for
reasonable royalty damages. The parties have so much discretion in
presenting calculations for reasonable royalty damages that it is not
uncommon for the patentee to request damages 80-100 times greater
than the infringer’s proposed damages. Permitting so much
discretion makes it highly unlikely that the resulting damages will be
reasonable, and thus fails to achieve the goal of determining a
reasonable royalty.
The problem is simple. Patents are difficult to value. When a third
party decision-maker, such as a jury, cannot accurately assess value,
the decision-maker often splits the difference as a compromise. If a
litigating party knows that the decision-maker is simply going to split
the difference, then that party has the incentive to argue for damages
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as far away from their opposing party as possible. This tactic allows
the party to skew the midpoint of the resulting split to their side as
much as possible. This misaligned incentive is the root cause of the
unpredictability in reasonable royalty damages and other proposals
have failed to address it.
The solution is also simple. The incentive for parties to make the
most widely varying damages arguments possible must be replaced
with an incentive to make the most reasonable argument for
damages. This could be accomplished by requiring the jury to
choose the more reasonable of the proposed royalty rates as the basis
for determining the reasonable royalty. Using this solution along
with some other proposals in the Article, I illustrate how the range of
damages argued by the parties in a recent case could have been
dramatically reduced from a factor of 100 to a factor of 2.5. When a
jury must decide between proposals that are only off by a factor of 2.5
it is much more likely that a “reasonable” royalty will be achieved.
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1. See Verdict Summary Report, Cornell Univ. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 609 F.
Supp. 2d 279 (N.D.N.Y. 2009) No. 01-CV-1974, 2008 WL 3166856, at *2 (listing the
range of damages given to the jury was $5,000,000 – 999,999,999).
2. 609 F. Supp. 2d 279 (N.D.N.Y. 2009).
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Although the goal of patent law in the area of damages is to
produce no less than a reasonable royalty, the amount of discretion
permitted to determine a reasonable royalty during litigation allows
for completely unreasonable arguments during litigation. More
structure is needed, especially where the patented invention is a
component of a product containing numerous patented inventions,
and the patentee has not practiced or licensed the patent. Current
law actually encourages unreasonable arguments for damages in
these cases, and a jury can be given a range of $5 million to $1 billion
to award damages. 1 Permitting such a large range makes outcomes
highly unpredictable and also makes it highly unlikely that a
reasonable royalty will be determined.
This research paper seeks to narrow this range of unpredictability
by determining the reasons for its existence and then proposing a
solution. Part I provides some background on remedies available to
patentees in an infringement suit and explains how current law
applies to a patentee who has not practiced or licensed the patent.
This Part also begins the discussion of how confusing it is to
determine a reasonable royalty, especially when the patented
invention is only one of many patented components on a product.
Part II continues this discussion by examining the 2009 case of
Cornell University v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 2 and how current law
encouraged the parties in that case to make unreasonable arguments
for the reasonable royalty damages. This Part looks at the expert
testimony in that case because this is the only way to fully understand
how reasonable royalties are being calculated during litigations. Part
III illustrates how current proposals to improve the process of
determining reasonable royalties fall short of addressing the main
issue causing the unpredictability in determining reasonable
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royalties. Part IV addresses the problems raised in Parts I and II as
well as the problems that remain after analyzing the proposals
discussed in Part III by using a structured approach to determine
reasonable royalty damages. The main feature of this structured
approach is that the jury is required to use the royalty rate offered by
one of the parties as the primary basis in determining the reasonable
royalty. This requirement gives the parties incentives to make
reasonable arguments at trial, which should result in more
settlements and more reasonable royalties. The proposal made here
also gives non-practicing patentees incentives to make a good faith
attempt to secure licensing in order to avoid reduced damages.
I. PATENT REMEDIES LAW APPLIED TO A NON-PRACTICING PATENTEE

C M
Y K
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3. 35 U.S.C. §§ 283-284 (2006).
4. See Benjamin Petersen, Injunctive Relief in the Post-eBay World, 23 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 193, 194 (2008) (discussing the strong correlation between a patentee’s
failing to practice a patent and denial of an injunction after the U.S. Supreme Court
rejected use of bright line rules to find injunctions in eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange,
L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006)).
5. A non-practicing patentee cannot obtain lost profits because the nonpracticing patentee cannot meet the market demand. See Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin
Bros. Fibre Works, Inc., 575 F.2d 1152, 1156 (6th Cir. 1978) (requiring that a
patentee have marketing capacity to exploit demand for an invention).
6. See, e.g., Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292, 1320-21 (Fed.
Cir. 2011) (showing how the expert witness for Uniloc USA was arguing for
reasonable royalty damages of $565 million while the expert witness for Microsoft was
arguing for damages of only $7 million); Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580
F.3d 1301, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (showing how the expert witness for Lucent argued
for a reasonable royalty of $562 million while Microsoft argued for a reasonable
royalty of only $6.5 million); Verdict Summary Report, supra note 1, at *2 (listing the
range of damages given to the jury was $5,000,000 – 999,999,999).
7. It is recognized that it is unrealistic for most non-practicing patentees to start
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There are two types of remedies for patent infringement: (1)
injunctions; and (2) damages. 3 Under current law, a patentee who
has not practiced or licensed the invention is generally unable to
obtain an injunction4 or damages from lost profits, 5 which leaves only
damages through determination of a reasonable royalty.
Determining reasonable royalty damages can be a highly
unpredictable process as shown by how far apart patentees and
defendants have argued for damages during litigation. 6 This
unpredictability encourages litigation and prevents settlements. To
address this problem, this paper proposes a solution to reduce this
range of unpredictability by encouraging parties to make reasonable
arguments for damages and also encouraging patentees to license or
practice their patents. Because part of the solution encourages nonpracticing patentees to practice their patents, 7 the following
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discussion on all the different remedies available to patentees
(including injunctions, lost profits, and reasonable royalties) is
relevant.
A. Injunctions

C M
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practicing their invention, but there may still be limited instances where this could
occur.
8. See Petersen, supra note 4, at 194 (discussing the strong correlation between
a patentee’s failing to practice a patent and denial of an injunction after the U.S.
Supreme Court rejected use of bright line rules to find injunctions in eBay, Inc., 547
U.S. 388 (2006)).
9. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006).
10. See eBay, 547 U.S. at 395 (Roberts, J., concurring) (explaining that “[f]rom
at least the early 19th century courts have granted injunctive relief upon a finding in
the vast majority of patent cases”).
11. eBay, 547 U.S. at 392.
12. Id.
13. Factors one and four also seem to favor the infringer because the nonpracticing patentee will not typically experience an irreparable injury and the public
may be disserved if the injunction completely removes the patented invention from
the marketplace.
14. Petersen, supra note 4, at 194.
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Under current law, a non-practicing patentee will likely have
difficulty obtaining an injunction in an infringement suit. 8
Injunctions are a strong expression of a patentee’s right to exclude
others from use of the patent. Courts may grant a patentee injunctive
relief in accordance with principles of equity. 9 Historically, once a
court found a patent valid and infringed, an injunction was almost
automatic. 10 In 2006 the Supreme Court rejected use of an automatic
injunction rule and held that under well-established principles of
equity, courts should use the traditional four-factor test to determine
whether to grant an injunction. 11 These factors include: (1) whether
the patentee has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) whether other
remedies are inadequate to compensate for the infringement; (3)
whether the balance of hardships in granting the injunction favors
the patentee; and (4) whether the public interest would be disserved
by an injunction.12
The non-practicing patentee will likely have trouble prevailing
under the traditional four-factor test. This is mainly because damages
should be adequate to compensate the non-practicing patentee
under factor two, and the balance of hardships appears to favor the
infringer who may have to stop production of the infringing product
under factor three. 13 Unsurprisingly, a denial of injunctions after
eBay has been strongly correlated with a patentee’s failure to practice
the patent. 14 Consequently, under current law a non-practicing
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patentee will typically only be able to seek damages.

B. Damages
Although courts may award damages for patent infringement
under different theories, a non-practicing patentee may only seek
damages for a reasonable royalty. In a suit for patent infringement, a
prevailing plaintiff is awarded damages “adequate to compensate for
the infringement, but in no event less than a reasonable royalty for
the use made of the invention by the infringer.”15 Damages can be an
awarded for: (1) lost profits; (2) an established royalty; or (3) a
reasonable royalty. 16 Furthermore, the method of assessing and
computing damages under 35 U.S.C. § 284 is within the discretion of
the court. 17 Thus, different methods to determine damages are
available, and the courts are not necessarily limited by the methods
previously used. This wide discretion is a major factor contributing to
the unpredictability of determining patent damages.

1. Damages for Lost Profits: Available Only to a Practicing Patentee

C M
Y K

10/28/2013 10:59:23

15. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006).
16. See Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1554 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (noting
that a patentee is entitled to a reasonable royalty if lost profits cannot be proved and
that an established royalty can be used to prove a reasonable royalty).
17. Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1310 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
(citing State Indus., Inc. v. Mor-Flo Indus., Inc. 883 F.2d 1573, 1576-77 (Fed. Cir.
1989)).
18. See Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc., 575 F.2d 1152, 1157 (6th
Cir.
1978) (“When actual damages, e.g., lost profits, cannot be proved, the patent owner
is entitled
to a reasonable royalty.”).
19. See Rite-Hite Corp., 56 F.3d at 1545 (citing Panduit Corp., 575 F.2d at 1156)
(noting the four-factor Panduit test used to determine if a patentee is entitled to lost
profits damages).

34033_amp 5-1 Sheet No. 6 Side B

If a patentee meets the requirements for a lost profits analysis, then
lost profits are used to determine damages if they exceed a
reasonable royalty. 18 However, lost profits only apply if the patentee
can meet a four-part test: including that the patentee can
manufacture and market the invention to meet consumer demand. 19
Since a non-practicing patentee is not a manufacturer and cannot
meet the consumer demand, a lost profits analysis does not apply.
The benefit of a lost profits determination is that the damages are
more predictable than a reasonable royalty because the patentee can
point to specific products where profits were lost. The downside is
that lost profits are difficult to prove and some practicing patentees
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As discussed below, a
prefer seeking a reasonable royalty.20
reasonable royalty analysis looks at royalties for comparable patents,
and what is comparable is subject to considerable discretion.

2. Damages for Established Royalties: Unavailable to a Non-Licensing
Patentee
Traditionally, a patentee may recover under an established royalty
when the patentee has consistently licensed others to engage in
conduct comparable to that of the defendant at a uniform royalty. 21
However, when a non-practicing patentee has not licensed to anyone,
there is no established royalty that can be used. Established royalties
are more predictable than reasonable royalties because the patentee
can point to specific licenses that license the patent in question.
However, established royalties do not necessarily make the
determination of the damages easy to predict because there can be
numerous differences between the infringing product and the
licensed products. Also, an established royalty may only serve as the
starting point for determining the reasonable royalty under the
hypothetical negotiation method discussed in the next section.22

3. Damages for Reasonable Royalties: Available to All Patentees

C M
Y K

10/28/2013 10:59:23

20. See Aron Levko, Chris Barry, Vincent Torres & Robert Marvin, PATENT
LITIGATION TRENDS AND THE INCREASING IMPACT OF NONPRACTICING ENTITIES 11
(2009) [hereinafter Levko et al.], available at http://www.pwc.com/us/en/forensicservices/publications/assets/2009-patent-litigation-study.pdf (noting that practicing
patentees often do not want to disclose proprietary cost and profit information that
would be required to be disclosed if they argued for lost profits).
21. Practicing Law Institute, Contemporary Issues in Patent Royalty Damages,
PATENT
LAW
CENTER
BLOG
(Oct.
13,
2010,
7:00
PM)
http://patentlawcenter.pli.edu/2010/10/13/contemporary-issues-in-patent-royaltydamages/.
22. See Bose Corp. v. JBL, Inc., 112 F. Supp. 2d 138, 165 (Fed. Cir. 2001)
(explaining that a court first looks to see if there is an established royalty rate when
determining a reasonable royalty rate).
23. See Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
(stating that there are several methods to determine a reasonable royalty, but then
only mentioning the analytical method and the hypothetical negotiation).
24. Id.

34033_amp 5-1 Sheet No. 7 Side A

There are two accepted approaches used to determine a
reasonable royalty: (1) the analytical method; and (2) the
hypothetical negotiation. 23 The analytical method focuses on the
infringer’s projections of profit for the infringing product. 24
Therefore, the analytical method would only apply if the infringer
had documents showing projections related to the patented
components and the documents could be obtained publicly or
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through discovery. The analytical method is rarely used likely
because such projections are usually not available.
Consequently, a non-practicing patentee who has not licensed the
patent is usually left to argue for damages under the hypothetical
negotiation approach, which is highly unpredictable, as mentioned
The hypothetical negotiation is the more common
above. 25
approach to finding a reasonable royalty. 26 “The hypothetical
negotiation or the ‘willing licensor-willing licensee’ approach,
attempts to ascertain the royalty upon which the parties would have
agreed had they successfully negotiated an agreement just before
infringement began.” 27 To determine the reasonable royalty that
would have been agreed upon at the hypothetical negotiation, the
jury or court often looks to fifteen factors initially laid out in the
Georgia Pacific case from 1970. 28 However, using these fifteen factors
does not lead to determining patent damages with any amount of
certainty. 29 Juries are given little guidance on how to use the

10/28/2013 10:59:23
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25. See cases cited supra note 6 (discussing three reasonable royalty cases where
the plaintiff and defendant were arguing for patent damages differing by greater
than $500 million).
26. Lucent Techs., Inc., 580 F.3d at 1324.
27. Id. (citing Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116,
1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1970)).
28. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 318 F. Supp. at 1120. The Georgia Pacific analysis
includes fifteen factors that are to be considered by a fact finder when determining
the amount of a reasonable royalty. Id. These factors include: (1) royalties received
by the patentee for prior licensing of the patent in suit; (2) rates paid by the licensee
for the use of other patents similar to the patent in suit; (3) the nature and scope of
the license; is it exclusive or non-exclusive or restricted in scope; (4) the licensor’s
established policy of maintaining its patent monopoly by not licensing others to use
the patent; (5) the commercial relationship between the licensor and licensee, such
as, whether they are competitors or inventor and promoter; (6) the effect of the
patented element in promoting the sales of other products of the licensee and the
value of the invention to the licensor; (7) the duration of the patent term and the
term of the license; (8) the established profitability of the product made under the
patent; (9) the utility and advantages of the patented product over old modes or
devices; (10) the nature of the patented invention and the benefits to those who have
used it; (11) the extent to which the infringer has made use of the invention; (12)
the portion of the profit or selling price that is customary in the business; (13) the
portion of the realizable profit that can be attributed to the patented elements as
distinguished from the non-patented elements; (14) the opinion testimony of
qualified experts; and (15) the amount that the licensor and a licensee would have
agreed upon at the time the infringement began if both had reasonably and
voluntarily trying to reach an agreement. Id.
29. See Defendant Hewlett-Packard Company’s Proposed Final Jury Instructions,
Cornell Univ. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 609 F. Supp. 2d 279 (N.D.N.Y. 2009) No. 01CV-1974, 2008 WL 2166594, at *2 (noting the proposed jury instructions from the
defendant merely list the factors and say that no one factor is dispositive); see also
Merrit J. Hasbrouck, Protecting the Gates of Reasonable Royalty: A Damages
Framework for Patent Infringement Cases, 11 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 192,
196 (2011) (“There is a general consensus that current law provides juries with
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factors. 30 The recent over ten-fold disparity between damages
awarded by judges and by juries amplifies the unpredictability of
reasonable royalty damages. 31
Overall, the Georgia Pacific factors seem like a black box to the
reader of a court opinion because the reader can often only see the
output from the black box, which is the reasonable royalty damages
amount. For example in Cornell, the input to the black box is
hidden because, without reading the expert testimony, the reader
cannot even tell what royalty rates were presented to the jury in the
first place. 32 The inner-workings of the black box—or how the jury
applies the fifteen Georgia Pacific factors—also remain a mystery if
one only reads the opinion. To provide some level of clarity, Part III
of this paper illustrates how an expert witness in Cornell suggested
the Georgia Pacific factors should be applied when the patentee does
not practice the patent and there is no established royalty.

C. Apportionment and the Entire Market Value Rule: Damages on
Products Containing Patented Components

C M
Y K

10/28/2013 10:59:23

insufficient information for determining a reasonable royalty.”).
30. See Hasbrouck, supra note 29, at 196 (noting that “[o]ften juries are given
little guidance in calculating a reasonable royalty amount and are forced to use a
confusing list of fifteen Georgia-Pacific factors with the expectation that they will
calculate a fair damages award”).
31. See Levko et al., supra note 20, at 10 (noting how jury awards for patent
damages since 2000 have been more than ten times greater than bench awards).
32. See generally Cornell, 609 F. Supp. 2d 279.
33. See, e.g., Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292, 1320-21 (Fed.
Cir. 2011) (explaining how the lower court initially allowed the plaintiff’s expert
witness to argue that damages for a patent, which did not drive any demand for
Microsoft Windows or Microsoft Office, should be based on the $19 billion entire
market value of revenue from Microsoft Windows and Microsoft Office, followed by
the same court instructing the jury not to consider the $19 billion when making their
determination).
34. Id. at 1318.
35. Id.

34033_amp 5-1 Sheet No. 8 Side A

Whether apportionment or the entire market value rule (EMVR)
applies adds another layer of complexity to determining patent
damages because courts have not been clear on when or how to apply
these rules. 33 If an infringing product contains many patented and
unpatented components, then assessing damages on only one
patented component can be a very complex task. The general rule is
that the patentee must give evidence to apportion the defendant’s
profits and the patentee’s damages between the single patented
component and the other features of the product. 34 The EMVR is an
exception to this apportionment requirement. 35 “The EMVR allows a
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patentee to assess damages based on the entire market value of the
accused product only where the patented feature creates the basis for
customer demand or substantially creates the value of the component
parts.” 36 Thus, if the patentee can show that either all or a substantial
amount of the demand for a product is due to the single patented
component, then the patentee may set the royalty base equal to the
entire market value of the product. 37 The patentee can then apply
the royalty rate to this—often much larger—royalty base to collect a
much larger reasonable royalty.38
It is unclear how the apportionment and the EMVR specifically fit
in to the Georgia Pacific factors. 39 Analyzing the Cornell case in Part
II below shows that a non-practicing patentee could argue for
application of the EMVR as part of the determination of reasonable
royalty damages. This analysis helps to understand how the EMVR
can be used in conjunction with the Georgia Pacific factors and how
this affects the amount of damages. Before moving to Part II, the
following section discusses a few EMVR cases to give a clearer picture
of when the EMVR should be applied.

D. How Courts Have Applied the Entire Market Value Rule

C M
Y K

10/28/2013 10:59:23

36. Id.
37. It remains to be seen what level of demand will trigger “substantial demand”
and enable application of the EMVR.
38. See infra Part II.B, C.
39. See Christopher B. Seaman, Reconsidering the Georgia-Pacific Standard for
Reasonable Royalty Patent Damages, 2010 BYU L. REV. 1661, 1699 n.204 (2010)
(claiming that although the Georgia Pacific factors do not expressly include the
EMVR, factors eight, ten, eleven, and thirteen require some of the same
considerations as the EMVR).
40. Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2009).

34033_amp 5-1 Sheet No. 8 Side B

There are a number of cases, mostly from the Federal Circuit, that
address infringing products containing patented components and
the use of the EMVR. The cases fit into three categories: (1) the
patented component is clearly not the cause for any market demand;
(2) the patented component clearly is the cause for market demand;
and (3) the patented component likely is the cause for some, but not
all of the market demand.
Category one cases, where the patented component is clearly not
the cause for market demand, typically pertain to products that
contain a multitude of components in areas such as software and
electronics. In Lucent Technologies, Inc., the Federal Circuit denied
the use of the EMVR because the patented invention formed such a
small portion of the overall product. 40 The patented invention in
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Lucent was the date-picker function used in software, such as
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41. Id. at 1308.
42. Id. at 1337-38.
43. Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
44. Id. at 1296.
45. Id. at 1320. Despite the court’s ruling, it does seem that Uniloc’s invention
did drive substantial demand because many users likely only bought the software
because they could not simply install an illegal copy.
46. 599 F.2d 958 (Ct. Cl. 1979).
47. Id. at 974-75.
48. Id. at 975.
49. 274 F.3d 1354, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
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Microsoft Outlook, where a user can enter information by clicking an
object on the screen instead of typing the information on the
keyboard. 41 The Federal Circuit held that there was insufficient
evidence that this single date-picking feature drove any consumer
demand. 42 Similarly, in Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., the
Federal Circuit again denied use of the EMVR. 43 In Uniloc, the
patented invention was a software registration system where users
must register a product key to activate the software. 44 The Federal
Circuit denied the use of the EMVR because allowing consumers to
register their software to prevent piracy obviously did not drive any
consumer demand. 45
Category two cases, where the patented component clearly is the
cause for market demand, typically pertain to products where the
patented component is the one new improvement over longestablished prior art. In Leesona Corp. v. United States, 46 the Court
of Claims awarded damages based on the entire value of a portable,
rechargeable battery system. 47 The patented component was clearly
the cause for market demand because the seller of the infringing
batteries could only meet the government specifications for the
battery by using the plaintiff’s patented invention. 48 These types of
cases are rare in today’s world because products typically contain
numerous patented inventions and the market demand could often
be due to other factors such as marketing or the reputation of the
seller.
Category three cases, where the patented component likely is the
cause for some, but not all, of the market demand is where
application of the EMVR becomes more complex. Such components
are often found in products sold in the computer and electronics
industries. In Bose Corp. v. JBL, Inc., 49 the Federal Circuit affirmed
application of the EMVR because the patented elliptical port tube
was integral to the overall performance of the speakers and
contributed substantially to the market demand for the products
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incorporating the port tube. 50 Importantly, the court noted that the
defendant’s marketing executive acknowledged that improved bass
performance was a requirement to manufacture the infringing
device. 51 In Cornell University v. Hewlett-Packard, discussed in detail
below, Judge Rader of the Federal Circuit—sitting by designation in
the district court—rejected application of the EMVR to the servers
and workstations that HP sold. 52 This rejection occurred despite
evidence that the patented component contributed to the overall
performance. 53 Thus, a contribution to the overall performance of a
product seems to be a requirement to apply the EMVR to that
product, but it remains unclear what degree of that contribution will
be deemed sufficiently “substantial” to apply the EMVR. Because of
the complexity of determining reasonable royalty damages and
because the patented invention in Cornell is typical of many of
today’s products, this case is investigated further to see specifically
how the reasonable royalty damages were determined in that case.
II. CALCULATION OF REASONABLE ROYALTIES IN THE CORNELL
UNIVERSITY V. HEWLETT-PACKARD CASE

C M
Y K
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50. Id. at 1361.
51. Id.
52. Cornell Univ. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 609 F. Supp. 2d 279, 287 (N.D.N.Y.
2009).
53. Id. at 283.
54. Id. at 286.
55. See District Court Ruling to partially exclude expert testimony of Plaintiff
Cornell Univ., Cornell Univ. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 609 F. Supp. 2d 279 (N.D.N.Y.
2009) No. 01-CV-1974, 2008 WL 2222189, at *1 (noting that once the royalty rate and
the royalty base have been set, then the calculation of a reasonable royalty is
“straightforward multiplication exercise”).
56. See infra notes 62-70 and accompanying text.
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The actual calculation of a reasonable royalty requires
determination of two separate quantities: (1) a royalty base, which is
the revenue pool implicated by the infringement; and (2) a royalty
rate, which is the percentage of that revenue pool adequate to
compensate the plaintiff for that infringement. 54 As discussed below,
the Georgia Pacific factors are often used to determine the royalty
rate and royalty base. The royalty base and royalty rate are then
multiplied together to find the reasonable royalty. 55 However, the
reasonable royalty calculations offered by Hewlett-Packard’s expert
witness in Cornell show that the formula in the preceding sentence
could be altered. 56 Although a precise method for determining a
reasonable royalty eludes us, the background, expert witness
testimony, and the eventual resulting damages from Cornell provide
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an example of the wide discretion permitted in calculating a
reasonable royalty under current law.

A. Background of the Cornell University v. Hewlett-Packard case
Cornell University’s invention, the ‘115 patent, allows processors to
complete multiple, non-dependent instructions per clock cycle. 57
Physically, the ‘115 patent claims an invention that is a component of
an instruction reorder buffer (IRB). 58 The IRB is a component of a
processor, and the processor a component of a CPU brick.59 The
CPU brick is a component of the infringing servers and workstations
that Hewlett-Packard (HP) sold. 60 Although the majority of the
infringement was from the server and workstation sales, HP also sold
a much smaller number of stand-alone processors that also
infringed. 61

B. Hewlett-Packard’s Method of Calculating a Reasonable Royalty

C M
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57. Cornell, 609 F. Supp. 2d at 283. The full patent number for the Cornell
invention is U.S. Patent Number 4,807,115.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Expert Witness Testimony for Defendant Hewlett-Packard Co. at 12, Cornell
Univ. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 609 F. Supp. 2d 279 (N.D.N.Y. 2009) No. 01-CV-1974,
2001 WL 36251280.
63. Id. It is unclear why HP used the eight percent for all of its calculations, but
is likely that HP was using eight percent because HP’s reasonable royalty calculation
depended more heavily on how much physical area that the invention took up on
the chip.
64. Id. at 10. Although HP argued for a $5.7 billion processor royalty base, the
court determined that is should be $6.7 billion.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 16.

34033_amp 5-1 Sheet No. 10 Side A

To calculate the reasonable royalty, HP’s expert witness used three
factors: a royalty rate; a royalty base; and a cost percentage. 62 There is
no evidence that this different method of calculating a reasonable
royalty (i.e., using a cost percentage) was rejected by the court. HP
used a standard eight percent royalty rate for all of its calculations.63
HP did the calculations using a roughly $5.7 billion royalty base 64 for
the processors and a roughly $23 billion royalty base for the CPU
bricks. 65 The cost percentage factor was set by dividing the cost of the
infringing circuitry die area over the total cost of a processor.66 For
one processor model in the $5.7 billion processor royalty base, HP’s
expert witness determined the following: (a) the total die cost was
$353; (b) the accused circuitry was 3.2% of the total die area; (c) the

34033_amp 5-1 Sheet No. 10 Side B

10/28/2013 10:59:23

MCMANUS__MACROFINAL10-21 (DO NOT DELETE)

14

AMERICAN UNIV. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY BRIEF

10/22/2013 2:37 PM

[Vol. 5:1

total processor cost was $600; and (d) the cost percentage of the
infringing circuitry was found to be 1.89%. 67 Due to varying cost
percentages on different models of processors, HP’s expert witness
calculated an overall reasonable royalty of $5.3 – 7.15 million.68
When HP’s expert witness ran the calculations for the $23 billion
CPU brick royalty base, the reasonable royalty was calculated to be
$7.67 million. 69 Thus, HP basically claimed that although the $23
billion royalty base is three to four times larger, the cost percentage is
three to four times smaller because the invention is a smaller portion
of the larger CPU brick royalty base. It is noteworthy that the Georgia
Pacific factors are not even mentioned in these calculations
performed by HP’s expert witness. 70

C. Cornell University’s Method of Calculating a Reasonable Royalty
Cornell’s expert witness used the customary path to calculate the
reasonable royalty by multiplying the royalty rate by the royalty base. 71
A royalty database was used to take an average of around twenty-three
comparable royalty rates in the semiconductor chip and integrated
circuit industries. 72 The median royalty rate of the comparable
royalties was three percent, so this was used as the starting point for
the hypothetical negotiation.73
This three percent starting point was then adjusted by the Georgia
Pacific factors. 74 Factor one did not apply 75 because although Cornell

10/28/2013 10:59:23
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67. Id. 1.89% was calculated from the following. Die cost of the accused
circuitry is $353 * 3.2% = $11.30. Cost percentage of the infringing circuitry relative
to the total processor cost is $11.30/$600 = 1.89%.
68. Id. There was a range because HP was also going to argue that the there was
an implied license from IBM on some of the processors. If the 1.89% was used for
the whole $5.7 billion royalty base, then the reasonable royalty would have been $8.6
million ($5.7 billion * 8% * 1.89% = $8.6 million).
69. Id. at 21.
70. Id. Since the jurors are instructed to use the Georgia Pacific factors, this may
be one reason why the jury awarded the plaintiff damages of $184 million instead of
the roughly $5-7 million HP was seeking. See Cornell, 609 F. Supp. 2d at 282 (noting
that the jury returned damages of $184 million).
71. Expert Witness Testimony for Plaintiff Cornell Univ., Cornell Univ. v.
Hewlett-Packard Co., 609 F. Supp. 2d 279 (N.D.N.Y. 2009) No. 01-CV-1974, 2008 WL
7928076.
72. See id. at 46-51 (noting that a database known as RoyaltySource was used to
compile thirty-six different patent licenses and then the thirty-six was reduced to
twenty-three because the defendant objected to thirteen of the royalty rates that
resulted from litigation or that were not from arm’s length negotiations).
73. Id. at 48-49, 52-53. This section discusses crucial pieces of information that
were only available in the expert testimony and not in any of the leading court
opinions on reasonable royalty damages, which is why the expert testimony was
critical to understanding how reasonable royalties are actually being determined.
74. See supra note 28 for a list of all fifteen of the Georgia Pacific factors.
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75. Expert Witness Testimony for Plaintiff Cornell Univ., supra note 71, at 53.
76. See Cornell Univ. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 609 F. Supp. 2d 270, 291 (N.D.N.Y.
2009) (noting that Cornell had expressly granted Intel a license, but not mentioning
whether there was a royalty associated with the licensing agreement).
77. See Expert Witness Testimony for Plaintiff Cornell Univ., supra note 71, at 53
(noting that there were only three available licenses because the rest of HP’s licenses
were cross licenses where no money was changing hands).
78. Id. at 55-56.
79. Id. at 56.
80. Id. at 57.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 58.
83. Id. at 59.
84. Id. at 60.
85. Id.

34033_amp 5-1 Sheet No. 11 Side A

had licensed the invention to Intel, Cornell may not have been
receiving royalties. 76 Factor two looked at three royalties paid by HP,
and since the average of these three royalties was lower than three
percent, this was counted as a negative factor. 77 Factors four and five
were viewed as negative factors because Cornell was not practicing its
invention and did not want to keep the patent for a competitive
edge. 78 Factor seven was viewed as a “modest” negative factor because
the patent term was about halfway over. 79 Factor eight was viewed as
a strong positive factor because of the profitability of the HP products
containing the invention. 80 Factors nine, ten, and eleven were all
viewed as strongly positive factors because those factors all related to
the advantages of the invention, and this invention had the
demonstrated advantage of making the processors faster. 81 Factor
thirteen was viewed as an important negative factor because Cornell
admitted that there was no doubt that HP’s brand name, reputation,
and other technical features in the product contributed to the
success of the infringing products. 82 A few other factors were not
mentioned. Cornell’s expert witness looked at the four positive
factors and the five negative factors and concluded that this creates a
“negative tilt,” which should result in the three percent royalty rate
being lowered to 2.5%. 83 The process described here is possibly
similar to how a jury uses the Georgia Pacific factors. Negative factors
cancel out positive factors for the most part, and any remaining
factors adjust the starting point by some kind of guess, which was
0.5% here.
Cornell’s expert originally wanted to argue that the appropriate
royalty base should be the revenue from the servers and workstations
for two reasons. 84 First, the twenty-three licensing agreements and
the three HP licensing agreements were structured on sales of entire
systems like a server or workstation.85 Second, the server and
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workstations sales were the only sales that represented a true
market. 86 However, after a Daubert hearing, Judge Rader precluded
Cornell from arguing that the royalty base should be the servers and
workstations because Cornell could not draw any connection between
the market for the servers and workstations and the patented
invention. 87
Cornell’s expert witness ended up arguing that the $23 billion of
estimated revenue from the CPU bricks could be used as an
alternative royalty base, but that this should be the minimum royalty
base used. 88 Applying the $23 billion royalty base to the 2.5% royalty
rate yielded a minimum reasonable royalty of $575 million. 89

D. The Holding in Cornell
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86. Id.
87. See District Court Ruling to partially exclude expert testimony of Plaintiff
Cornell Univ., supra note 55 at *3 (concluding that Cornell only showed that
consumers opted for better performance and that the invention here was one of
several components that added to performance, and that this was insufficient to
justify using the server and workstation revenue as the royalty base).
88. Expert Witness Testimony for Plaintiff Cornell Univ., supra note 71, at 65.
89. Id.
90. Cornell Univ. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 609 F. Supp. 2d 270, 282 (N.D.N.Y.
2009).
91. See supra note 70. The Georgia Pacific factors were in the jury instructions.
The jury probably started with a comparable royalty rate, listed the positive and
negative factors, and then made some kind of guess to adjust the starting point
royalty rate based on the excess of positive factors over negative factors or vise versa.
92. Cornell, 609 F. Supp. 2d at 282.
93. Id. at 292.
94. Id. Judge Rader held that the substantial evidence did support the royalty
rate of 0.8%. Id. at 293.
95. Id. at 292. (citing Cornell Univ. v. Hewlett Packard Co., 609 F. Supp. 2d 279
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The jury awarded Cornell $184 million in damages after applying a
royalty rate of 0.8% to the CPU brick royalty base of $23 billion. 90 It
is unclear how the jury determined the royalty rate to be 0.8%. 91 HP
moved for judgment as a matter of law that the $23 billion royalty
base was wrong. 92 In response, Judge Rader concluded the damages
were grossly excessive due to the jury’s use of the $23 billion royalty
base. 93 He determined that the $6.7 billion processor royalty base was
proper, but did not adjust the royalty rate. 94 The potential for juries
to use a grossly excessive royalty base adds to the unpredictability of
reasonable royalty damages. This contributes to litigation and
appeals while preventing settlements.
Although Judge Rader did make it clear that the evidence did not
support use of the EMVR to the $23 billion royalty base of the CPU
bricks, 95 the holding in effect incorrectly applies the EMVR to the
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$6.7 billion processor royalty base. Judge Rader rejected application
of the EMVR to the $23 billion CPU brick royalty base because (1)
the patented invention was only one of several components that
contributed to performance of the CPU brick and (2) because
Cornell did not offer any demand curves to show the relationship
between the patented invention and demand for HP’s products
containing the patented invention.96
However, there were also no demand curves for the processors.
This makes it unclear why apportionment of the $6.7 billion royalty
base was not required. It is likely because HP’s brief for judgment as
a matter of law after the trial only argued for lowering the royalty
base to the $6.7 billion processor royalty base.97 After lowering the
royalty base to $6.7 billion, Judge Rader likely determined the
damages were no longer grossly excessive. However, this does not
seem sufficient to completely bypass what is supposed to be an
apportionment requirement. In the end, the resulting damages seem
as arbitrary as throwing a dart somewhere between a high and low
number, and the damages would likely come out significantly
different if the same case were tried again.

E. The Takeaway from Cornell
The main takeaway from Cornell is that the plaintiffs should
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(N.D.N.Y. 2009) No. 01-CV-1974, 2008 WL 2222189).
96. Id. at 284.
97. See Reply Brief for Defendant Hewlett-Packard Co. in Support of Judgment
as a Matter Of Law that Proper Royalty Base was the Processor Sales, Cornell Univ. v.
Hewlett-Packard Co., 609 F. Supp. 2d 279 (N.D.N.Y. 2009) No. 501-CV-1974, 2008
WL 4345825 at *8-9.
98. Cornell, 609 F. Supp. 2d at 283-284.
99. Id. at 282.

34033_amp 5-1 Sheet No. 12 Side A

continue to aim as high as possible and the defendants should
continue to aim as low as possible, regardless if there is a lack of logic
to their arguments. For example, despite stopping the trial to
conduct a Daubert hearing, in which the court excluded the $36
billion server and workstation royalty base because it was not
supported by any substantial evidence, the court then decided to
allow other theories to calculate damages that had just as
questionable evidentiary support. 98 The jury showed this “aim as high
as possible” approach was at least temporarily successful when the
jury used this $23 billion royalty base for its calculations. 99 If Cornell
did not have enough evidence to argue that the proper royalty base
was the servers and workstations, then how did Cornell have enough
evidence to argue that the CPU bricks should be the proper royalty
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100. The CPU bricks were not sold, so there was no market for them to connect
any demand. Id. at 287.
101. Cornell’s expert witness noted that these types of cost-based deals are only
used for development agreements—where a seller outsources its manufacturing—
and not where an independent patentee is negotiating with a licensee. Expert
Witness Testimony for Plaintiff Cornell Univ., supra note 71, at 34.
102. For an extreme example, consider an invention that is reduced to software
code. Development costs for software may be high, but the cost of copying or
“manufacturing” the code is very low.
103. Expert Witness Testimony for Defendant Hewlett-Packard Co., supra note 62,
at 18. Although HP argued for a $5.7 billion processor royalty base, it ended up
being $6.7 billion. Cornell Univ. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 609 F. Supp. 2d 279, 292
(N.D.N.Y. 2009).
104. Royalty Rate = Royalty Damages/Royalty Base.
105. See Reply Brief for Defendant Hewlett-Packard Co., supra note 97, at 7
(showing how HP only argued that the royalty base used by the jury was wrong, but
not that the royalty rate used by the jury was wrong).
106. Expert Witness Testimony for Plaintiff Cornell Univ., supra note 71, at 59.
107. See supra notes 103-104 and accompanying text.
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base when there was no evidence specific to the CPU bricks?100
As for HP aiming as low as possible with its questionable royalty
calculation, there did not appear to be any evidence that any
patentees were licensing their inventions for royalty rates that
depended on what percentage of the semiconductor chip their
invention physically covered. 101 One could conclude from common
sense that the value of an invention should not depend on the
physical size or manufacturing cost. Many valuable inventions are
quite inexpensive to produce once the process to manufacture them
is known. 102 HP’s cost percentage theory allowed HP to argue the
damages should be as low as $5.3 million on the $5.7 billion
processor royalty base, 103 which gives an effective royalty rate of
0.093%. 104 This scheme was HP’s successful attempt at aiming as low
as possible. It is clear that it was successful because HP only
challenged the royalty base and not the royalty rate used by the jury
when HP filed its post-verdict motion for judgment as a matter of law
on the damages.105
The second takeaway from Cornell is that the jury’s method of
using the Georgia Pacific factors likely only amounts to picking some
royalty rate in between the rates proposed by the parties. How did
the jury arrive at the 0.8% royalty rate? Cornell’s expert conceded
that the royalty rate should be adjusted down to 2.5% from its three
percent starting point due to more negative factors than positive
factors, 106 so this likely set the upper limit for the jury. As noted in
the paragraph directly above, HP’s expert witness presented that the
damages should be as low as $5.3 million, which gave an effective
royalty rate of 0.093%. 107 In the end, the jury likely did the best they
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could to split the difference of 2.5% and 0.093% and landed at 0.8%.
If juries largely end up splitting the difference, then parties are
justified in aiming as high and as low as possible with their
arguments, which, as stated above, is the main takeaway from the
case.
The third takeaway from Cornell is that the opinion creates as
many questions as answers for application of the EMVR. Does Judge
Rader’s holding mean that Cornell provided enough evidence to
support applying the EMVR to the $6.7 billion processor royalty base,
or does the opinion just mean that the damages were not grossly
excessive after the royalty base was lowered from $23 billion to $6.7
billion? If the evidence did support the application of the EMVR,
then what was that specific evidence? If the evidence did not support
application of the EMVR, then why was apportionment of the royalty
base not required? Judge Rader’s opinion discloses that this issue was
never even settled.
For example, in this case, application of entire market value
rule might enable Cornell to obtain royalties not only on the
claimed features of the IRB but also on sales of processors
which includes features beyond the scope of the claimed
invention. 108
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108. Cornell Univ., 609 F. Supp. at 286 (emphasis added).
109. See, e.g., Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1318, 1319 (Fed. Cir.
2011) (explaining how the lower court initially allowed the plaintiff’s expert witness
to argue that damages for a patent, which did not drive any demand for Microsoft
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This does show that Cornell would have at least had a decent
chance at applying the EMVR to the processor royalty base.
The argument could be made that the Cornell opinion did possibly
manage to lower the upper limit that plaintiffs will likely argue for
cases, where the patented component is only one of many factors that
contribute to market demand. This is because judges will likely begin
to require substantial support before such evidence is presented to
the jury. On the other hand, if defendants continue to argue for the
lowest possible royalty with questionable theories, such as calculations
based on the physical size of the invention, then it may still be in the
plaintiff’s best interest to match that with arguments for the highest
possible royalty. This is because as the trial ends, the high and low
are presented to the jury, who is left to wrestle with the Georgia
Pacific factors to split the difference. Due to the complexity of
applying reasonable royalty rules and the illogical arguments allowed
in the Cornell case and similar cases, 109 more structure is needed in
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determining reasonable royalties. Before moving on to discussing the
solution this Article proposes, it is worth examining some of the
other proposals that have been made to address the problems in
determining reasonable royalty damages.
III. CURRENT PROPOSALS IMPROVE THE DETERMINATION OF
REASONABLE ROYALTY DAMAGES, BUT FAIL TO PROVIDE A SOLUTION
Numerous verdicts exceeding $100 million in reasonable royalty
cases have made the proper determination of reasonable royalties a
popular topic. 110 As discussed in this Part, various reasonable royalty
articles have been written offering different proposals to improve the
process. Two approaches, 111 the “Gatekeeper Approach” 112 and the

10/28/2013 10:59:23
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Windows or Microsoft Office, should be based on the $19 billion entire market value
of revenue from Microsoft Windows and Microsoft Office); Lucent Techs., Inc. v.
Gateway Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (showing how Lucent was able to
present that damages for its date-picker patent should be based off the entire market
value of Microsoft Outlook when Lucent did not present any evidence that the
patent drove any substantial amount of demand).
110. See Christopher B. Seaman, Reconsidering the Georgia-Pacific Standard for
Reasonable Royalty Patent Damages, 2010 B.Y.U.L. REV. 1661, 1663-65 (2010)
(listing ten different verdicts for reasonable royalty damages in excess of $100 million
between the years of 2007 through 2009).
111. The next two paragraphs introduce the Gatekeeper Approach and the
Structured Georgia Pacific Approach. Other proposals have been made, but those
approaches likely have limited application or do not appear to clearly improve the
process. See, e.g., Seaman, supra note 39, at 1667 (proposing that a reasonable
royalty for patent infringement should not exceed the accused infringer’s expected
costs of adopting an acceptable non-infringing substitute). The key issue is
determining if an acceptable non-infringing substitute exists. Using the cost of a
non-infringing substitute as a method to calculate a reasonable royalty does appear
to be much better than using the Georgia Pacific factors when the non-infringing
substitute is a true substitute. See, e.g., id. at 1714 (citing Riles v. Shell Exploration &
Prod. Co., 298 F.3d 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2002)) (describing how the Federal Circuit
vacated a reasonable royalty damages award for the infringement of a method to
anchor an oil rig because the patentee’s expert witness did not consider how much it
would have cost the infringer to use a non-infringing alternative to anchor the same
oil rig). This may be a proper analysis when the patent is a method of anchoring an
oil rig and there is an alternative non-infringing method that accomplishes the same
result (i.e., a true substitute). It may be more difficult to apply this theory to many of
today’s products that can contain a multitude of patented components. See, e.g.,
Seaman, supra note 39, at 1717 (describing how this same theory could be used to
determine a reasonable royalty for an iPhone 4 by assuming it could be substituted
with earlier versions of the iPhone). A comparison between products containing a
multitude of patents, such as cell phones, does not seem to help to value one patent
on the infringing cell phone, which is what would need to be done in a reasonable
royalty case. Using a license of a non-infringing substitute for the infringing patent
would help though, but this is essentially what expert witnesses already do when
making claims about comparable licenses. See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying
text (noting that Cornell’s expert witness used a royalty database to take an average
of around twenty-three comparable royalty rates). Despite that this essentially
already exists, it does seem obvious that more weight should be given to a license for
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“Structured Georgia Pacific Approach”, 113 have identified clear areas
for improving the determination of a reasonable royalty. However,
these two approaches fall short of the solution that is needed.
One clear area of improvement is prohibiting patentees from
presenting evidence on royalty bases or royalty rates that have no
evidentiary support. To accomplish this, various articles have
advocated for stronger rules requiring or encouraging judges to act
as gatekeepers (the “Gatekeeper Approach”) by using Daubert
hearings in order to exclude or limit damages evidence that lacks
support, such as questionable royalty bases. 114 In Cornell, Judge
Rader acted as a gatekeeper by using a Daubert hearing to prevent
the plaintiff from arguing that the $36 billion in revenue from the
server sales should be the proper royalty base. 115 Using a Daubert
hearing to screen out unreasonable royalty bases can substantially
improve the determination of a reasonable royalty by considerably
reducing the upper limit of what the plaintiff can credibly request for
damages. Similar benefits would be achieved through excluding
royalty rates that have no evidentiary support.116 This significantly
and appropriately narrows the range of damages that the opposing
parties can request and thus improves the reasonable royalty
determination.
On the other hand, this is not a solution to determine reasonable
royalties because it likely only results in removing the arguments that
clearly lack support. 117 If the court does limit evidence through
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a non-infringing substitute than simply a comparable license, but the big question is
if that license exists. Thus, this approach seems to have limited application to cases
such as the oil rig patent, or it does not seem to make much of an improvement in
cases such as valuing a patent on a cell phone.
112. See infra notes 114-18 and accompanying text.
113. See infra notes 119-23 and accompanying text.
114. See, e.g., Hasbrouck, supra note 29, at 215 (stating that Congress should
require courts to conduct thorough Daubert hearings in reasonable royalty cases and
noting that although judges are currently permitted to exclude evidence in Daubert
hearings, actual exclusions are rare); Bo Zeng, Lucent v. Gateway: Putting the
Reasonable Back into Reasonable Royalties, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 329, 358-360
(2011) (discussing how Daubert hearings are rarely conducted despite numerous
cases where the parties should have challenged the admissibility of the expert
testimony).
115. See Cornell Univ. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 609 F.Supp.2d 279, 287 (N.D.N.Y.
2009) (discussing how the court conducted a Daubert hearing to exclude the server
royalty base).
116. See, e.g., Hasbrouck, supra note 29, at 214 (stating that only royalty rates for
comparable licenses should be allowed to be presented by the parties in a reasonable
royalty case).
117. See, e.g., Cornell, 609 F. Supp. 2d at 284 (showing how the court conducted
a Daubert hearing to exclude the server royalty base that clearly lacked support, but
then allowed Cornell to use the CPU brick revenue estimates as the royalty base,
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Daubert hearings, the parties will likely react by making the most
widely varying arguments still available to them. For example, after
the court conducted a Daubert hearing in Cornell to exclude the
server royalty base, Cornell simply responded by using the CPU brick
sales as the royalty base118 even though that evidentiary support was as
weak as the support for using the server sales as the royalty base.
Despite this shortcoming, this improvement should be utilized in any
reform made to determine reasonable royalties. Consequently, this
Gatekeeper Approach is included in the proposal this Article makes
for determining a reasonable royalty discussed below in Part IV.
Another area needing improvement is the lack of direction given
to juries on applying the Georgia Pacific factors. Today’s juries are
simply given a list of the fifteen Georgia Pacific factors and instructed
to apply the factors to the evidence without any other direction. 119
One proposal recognizes this problem and recommends improving
the determination of a reasonable royalty by requiring a structured
approach to using the Georgia Pacific factors (the “Structured
Georgia Pacific Approach”). 120 This Structured Georgia Pacific
Approach proposes that a reasonable royalty can be determined by
placing Georgia Pacific factors one through thirteen 121 into four
separate categories and using each category and its factors to answer
one of four relevant questions. 122 It proposes that the expert witnesses
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which also lacked support).
118. Cornell, 609 F. Supp. 2d at 284.
119. See, e.g., Final Jury Instructions at 55-56, Apple Inc. v. Samsung Electronics
Co., Ltd., No. 11-CV-01846-LHK (N.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2012), 2012 WL 3568795
(showing that jury instruction forty-one out of eighty-four simply lists all fifteen
Georgia Pacific factors and that instruction fort-one simply ends with “[i]t is up to
you, based on the evidence, to decide what type of royalty is appropriate in this
case”). No other direction on how to use the Georgia Pacific factors is given. Id.
120. See Daralyn J. Durie & Mark A. Lemley, A Structured Approach to
Calculating Reasonable Royalties, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 627, 636-643 (2010)
(suggesting that juries are overwhelmed by simply being handed the list of Georgia
Pacific factors and that juries clearly need some direction on how to use the factors
since some of the factors may be “irrelevant, overlapping, or even contradictory”).
121. See id. at 643 (explaining that factors fourteen and fifteen are “not really
factors to be weighed at all”). Factor fourteen, the opinion testimony of qualified
experts is simply the source of most of the evidence to be used on the other factors.
Id. Factor fifteen, which describes the hypothetical negotiation between a willing
licensor and willing licensee, “represents the ultimate question all of the other
factors are trying to establish.” Id.
122. See id. at 635 (listing the four relevant questions to be considered). The
relevant questions are: “(1) whether the patentee in fact produces a product in the
market; (2) the contribution made by the patented technology compared to the next
best alternative; (3) the number and importance of other inputs necessary to make
that technology work; and (4) evidence of how the market has actually valued the
patent to the extent it differs from the outcome of (1), (2), and (3).” Id.
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123. Id. at 643. See supra note 81 and accompanying text for an example where
Cornell’s expert witness explained that the output of applying the Georgia Pacific
factors should be a royalty rate of 2.5%.
124. Durie & Lemley, supra note 120, at 643.
125. See id. at 642-44 (explaining the advantages of the proposed structured
approach).
126. See cases cited supra note 6 and accompanying text (listing three cases
having a range of damages given to the jury of at least $500 million).
127. See id. (noting three cases having a range of damages given to the jury of at
least $500 million, which certainly implies that the patents in those cases were
difficult to value).
128. See Durie & Lemley, supra note 120, at 628-29 (noting that the plaintiff has
incentive to “shoot for the moon” when the jury has “virtual carte blanche to pick a

34033_amp 5-1 Sheet No. 15 Side A

should be limited to presenting evidence that answers these four
questions instead of being able to explain what the output of
applying the Georgia Pacific factors should be.123 This approach
further recommends the use of special verdict forms, so there can be
meaningful judicial review of the jury’s findings on damages.124
The advantages of this Structured Georgia Pacific Approach
include: (1) the transformation of the confusing list of factors into a
series of four straightforward questions; (2) the transparency that is
provided by using a structured approach and special verdict forms;
and (3) the potential for meaningful judicial review that is possible
with the new-found transparency. 125 The benefits of this approach
are clear and the changes, such as clearer jury instructions and use of
special verdict forms, do not appear difficult to implement. Thus,
this approach should be undertaken as a minimum to improve the
determination of reasonable royalty damages when applying the
Georgia Pacific factors. The problem with this approach is that it
only takes effect after the parties attempt to argue for damages as far
apart as possible, and the Structured Georgia Pacific Approach may
not be enough to produce a reasonable royalty if future parties
remain as successful as parties have been in the past in presenting
extremely large ranges to the jury.126
Although the Gatekeeper Approach and the Structured Georgia
Pacific Approach would both improve the process of determining a
reasonable royalty, both fail to address the main problem, which
makes reasonable royalty determination so unpredictable. This
problem is simple. Patents are difficult to value. 127 When a third
party decision-maker, such as a jury, cannot accurately assess value,
the decision-maker often splits the difference as a compromise. If a
litigating party knows that the decision-maker is simply going to split
the difference, then that party has the incentive to argue for damages
as far away from their opposing party as possible. 128 This tactic allows
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the party to skew the midpoint of the resulting split to their side as
much as possible. This misaligned incentive is the root cause of the
unpredictability in patent damages and it must be addressed.
The solution is also simple. The incentive for parties to make the
most widely varying damages arguments possible must be replaced
with an incentive to make the most reasonable argument for
damages. This could be accomplished by requiring the jury to
choose the more reasonable of the proposed royalty rates as the basis
for determining the reasonable royalty. In Part IV, this new incentive
is used with some other proposals, including the Gatekeeper
Approach, to illustrate how the range of damages argued by the
parties in Cornell could have been dramatically reduced from a
factor of 100 to a factor of 2.5.
IV. ADDRESSING REASONABLE ROYALTY UNCERTAINTY BY REQUIRING
MORE STRUCTURE AND CHANGING INCENTIVES
To address the current unpredictability in determining reasonable
royalty damages, this article proposes a new structured approach.
This structure is needed to reduce the incentives opposing parties
have to make the most widely varying arguments for damages
possible, and to give non-practicing patentees incentives to make a
good faith attempt to license their patent. A six-step procedure is
proposed to accomplish these goals. Overall, the reasonable royalty
will be calculated by multiplying a royalty base by a royalty rate.

damages number”).

C M
Y K
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In step one, the royalty base is determined, and it is generally
limited to the revenue from smallest salable component containing
the patented invention unless the patentee can show the EMVR is
applicable to a larger component or product. To show the EMVR is
applicable, the patentee must present evidence from market surveys
or make it abundantly clear that demand was due to the patented
component. The surveys must conclusively show that the entire
market value of the product or component is attributed to the
patented invention.
In the absence of market surveys, the patentee must have strong
evidence to make it abundantly clear that the patented component
drove demand. This strong evidence will likely only be met in cases
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A. Setting the Royalty Base: Evidence Required for the Entire Market
Value Rule
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129. Leesona Corp. v. United States, 599 F.2d 958 (Ct. Cl. 1979). See supra, Part
I.D (discussing “category two” cases where the patented component is clearly the
cause for market demand).
130. Bose Corp. v. JBL, Inc., 274 F.3d 1354, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2001). See supra Part
I.D (discussing “category three” cases where the patented component is likely the
cause for some of the market demand).
131. See Cornell Univ. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 609 F. Supp. 2d 279, 287
(discussing how the court conducted a Daubert hearing to exclude the server royalty
base and then implied that the CPU brick royalty base should have also been
excluded).
132. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
133. $23 billion is 3.43 times larger than 6.7 billion. And since there is a direct
relationship between royalty base and royalty damages under the procedure
proposed here, the range of damages are cut by more than a third.
134. See supra Part II.B-C (showing the original arguments for damages offered by
HP and Cornell).
135. HP’s calculation is unaffected by step one, but Cornell’s reasonable royalty
now has an upper limit of $6.7 billion * 2.5% = $167.5 million.
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such as Leesona, 129 where the patented component was the only way
to meet the buyer’s specifications, or in cases such as Bose, 130 where
the evidence is so strong, even the defendant admits the patented
component is integral to the performance of the overall product.
Furthermore, in jury cases, courts should be required to conduct
Daubert hearings to screen out royalty bases and royalty rates that
lack evidentiary support (i.e., the Gatekeeper Approach). 131
Proposals for stronger rules to require or encourage the use of
Daubert hearings are discussed in numerous articles. 132 As stated
above parties should only be able to argue for application of the
EMVR by presenting evidence from market surveys or by making it
abundantly clear that demand was due to the patented component.
If Daubert hearings were required using these rules, this would limit
the occurrences of arguments for application of the EMVR when
there is no evidence to support it.
The rules from this step would have prevented Cornell from
arguing that the royalty base should have been the $23 billion CPU
brick royalty base because there were no market surveys or any
evidence that would make it abundantly clear that the demand was
due to Cornell’s patented component. Consequently, Cornell would
have been left with a royalty base of the smallest salable component,
the $6.7 billion processor royalty base. As you can see, this
requirement alone would have reduced the range of damages by
more than a third of what they were without the requirement. 133
Applying step one, the range of damages argued by the parties, which
started at $5.7 million to $575 million, 134 is now reduced to $5.7
million to $167.5 million. 135 Thus, we are on our way to making
reasonable royalty damages more predictable.
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B. Setting the Royalty Rate: Reasonableness Required

C M
Y K

10/28/2013 10:59:23

136. See supra Part II.B (discussing HP’s cost percentage theory, which concludes
that the value of a patent on a processor should be based on the ratio of the cost of
the infringing circuitry die area over the cost of the whole processor).
137. See supra Part II.E (explaining how reasonable royalty damages of $5.3
million on a $5.7 billion processor royalty base gives an effective royalty rate of
0.093%).
138. If obtaining data on the number of patents used on similar products proves
too costly, then it is possible that some industry averages could be applied. For
example, if an expert witness in a case similar to Cornell was presenting evidence on
a royalty rate applied to a processor used on a Dell server, but the number of patents
used in the design of the Dell server was unknown, then the expert witness could
present evidence on the average number of patents used on server processors, which
were similar to the processor on the Dell server.
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In step two, the parties are required to present evidence on what
they believe the royalty rate should be by providing examples of
royalty rates for licensing of similar patents or any existing exemplar
licenses of the same patent. The parties cannot start by picking a
random rate out of out of thin air as HP did by starting with a
“standard eight percent,” and then apply that random number to a
new theory, such as cost percentage 136 to create an effective royalty
rate of 0.093%. 137 The parties are required to make reasonable
adjustments to their royalty rate using the Georgia Pacific factors.
Also, parties must include in their explanation of a similar royalty
rate, the number of patents on the product that was the royalty base
for that similar royalty rate. 138 This normalizes the royalty rates
because applying a three percent royalty rate on a product containing
ten patents to a different product containing 100 patents is not really
comparable. The defendant will have the burden to show the
number of patents on the product or component that was
determined to be the royalty base in step one. The defendant is
given this burden because, as the manufacturer or seller of the
infringing product or component, it should have superior knowledge
as to the number of patents on that product or component.
Additionally, the defendant also has the incentive to identify a larger
number of patents on that product or component.
In step three, the jury must pick either the plaintiff’s royalty rate or
the defendant’s royalty rate as a starting point. The jury may not
simply pick some middle ground. This requirement replaces the
incentive for the parties to argue as high and low as possible with an
incentive to make an argument that is more reasonable than the
opposing party. The jury is required to consider the Georgia Pacific
factors to determine which party’s royalty rate is more reasonable.
This incentive for reasonableness should greatly narrow the range of
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139. See Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
(noting that the license agreements that Lucent was using to make its reasonable
royalty damages arguments were not comparable to Lucent’s date-picker patent).
140. See Expert Witness Testimony for Defendant Hewlett-Packard Co., supra
note 62, at 14-15 (discussing HP’s cost percentage theory, which concludes that the
value of a patent on a processor should be based on the ratio of the cost of the
infringing circuitry die area over the cost of the whole processor). See also supra
Part III.B (explaining some of the details of HP’s cost percentage theory).
141. See Benjamin A Trulis, Final-Offer “Baseball” Arbitration: Contexts,
Mechanics & Applications, 20 SETON HALL J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 85, 86 (2010) (noting
that the most discussed use of final-offer arbitration is its application in resolving
MLB disputes).
142. Id. at 186.
143. See id. at 88 (noting that final-offer arbitration was developed to counteract
the fear that the arbitrator will simply “split the difference”).
144. Id. at 88.
145. Id. at 89.
146. See cases cited supra note 6 and accompanying text (listing three cases
having a range of damages given to the jury of at least $500 million).
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reasonable royalties presented. For example in Lucent, it is unlikely
Lucent would have taken the risk to make arguments for its damages
using license agreements that were not “in any way similar to the
technology litigated.” 139 Similarly, in Cornell, HP probably would not
have felt comfortable making arguments as unreasonable as claiming
the value of an invention should be determined by its physical size.140
Requiring the jury to pick the most reasonable royalty rate is
similar to what is known as final-offer arbitration or “baseball
arbitration,” due to its use in resolving salary disputes in Major
League Baseball (MLB). 141 Final-offer arbitration requires the
arbitrator to choose the offer of one of the parties involved in the
arbitration, whereas conventional arbitration allows the arbitrator to
choose the settlement amount. 142 Although patent damages seem
quite different from a MLB salary, both share one main problem, the
fear that the decision-maker will simply split the difference between
the parties’ positions. 143 This problem results in the parties taking
extreme positions and refusing to settle. 144 Final-offer arbitration
addresses this problem by giving the parties an incentive to make a
reasonable argument because the arbitrator must only pick one of
the offers. 145 Due to the extreme ranges for damages given to juries
in Cornell and similar cases, one can only assume that the jury is
simply splitting the difference, and that the parties arguing patent
damages also need this incentive to make reasonable arguments.146
Step three provides this incentive, and it could have made a
significant difference in Cornell.
The incentive to make a reasonable argument in Cornell would
have likely forced HP to argue for a royalty rate of approximately one
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percent. This is despite the fact that HP asked for an effective royalty
rate of 0.093% based on its cost percentage factor theory. 147 It is
evident that HP considered a royalty rate of approximately one
percent to be reasonable because HP did not even challenge the
0.8% royalty rate returned by the jury in its post-verdict motion for
judgment as a matter of law on the damages. 148 Therefore, if HP
started its damages argument with what HP actually considered a
reasonable royalty rate, approximately one percent, the range of
damages to be argued by the two parties would have been narrowed
even further. Assuming Cornell considered its 2.5% royalty rate
reasonable, 149 and using the $6.7 billion royalty base determined in
step one, the range of damages would have started off at $67 million
to $167.5 million. 150
With these three steps, the range of damages has been reduced
from approximately $570 million to approximately $100 million.
More importantly, Cornell’s requested damages are now only 2.5
times HP’s proposed damages as opposed to the actual argument in
court, where Cornell’s requested damages were over 100 times
greater than HP’s proposed damages. 151 Consequently, the parties
are now only off by a multiple, where it is believable that they would
have actually negotiated with each other before the infringement.
This belief is important because the hypothetical negotiation is
supposed to simulate how a willing licensor and willing licensee
would behave if an actual negotiation occurred. Willing licensors
and willing licensees make reasonable arguments during actual
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147. See supra Part II.E (explaining how reasonable royalty damages of $5.3
million on a $5.7 billion processor royalty base gives an effective royalty rate of
0.093%).
148. See Reply Brief for Defendant Hewlett-Packard Co., supra note 97, at *8-9
(showing how HP only argued that the royalty base used by the jury was wrong, but
not arguing that the royalty rate used by the jury was wrong). It is also believable that
HP considered a royalty rate around one percent or higher to be reasonable because
when HP had Cornell remove thirteen of the thirty-six comparable licenses Cornell
was proposing, the average of the remaining proposed comparable royalty rates,
which started at around three percent, actually increased. See Expert Witness
Testimony for Plaintiff Cornell Univ., supra note 71 (noting Cornell’s exclusion of
thirteen of its thirty-six proposed comparable royalty rates after HP’s objection to a
number of the proposed comparable licenses).
149. This may be a big assumption. The first two royalty bases attempted by
Cornell ended up being rejected by the court, so there is no reason to assume that
their first attempt for arguing a royalty rate was reasonable. See supra Part III.C
(discussing how the court ultimately rejected Cornell’s attempts to use the server
revenue or CPU brick revenue as a royalty base).
150. 6.7 billion * 1% = $67 million & $6.7 billion * 2.5% = $167.5 billion.
151. See supra Part III.B-C (showing that HP originally offered damages of $ 5.7
million while Cornell requested damages of $575 million).
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152. See supra notes 119-26 and accompanying text.
153. For example, the Structured Georgia Pacific Approach requires the parties to
present evidence on the different Georgia Pacific factors, which would have likely
screened out HP’s cost percentage theory.
154. While choosing twenty percent as the limit is somewhat arbitrary, this
number should probably not be increased above thirty-three percent due to all of the
criticism that exists for using the Georgia Pacific factors as the main method for
determining reasonable royalty damages.
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licensing negotiations because they do not want to risk losing a
potentially valuable royalty or license. Parties who believe their
opposing party’s price is off by a factor of 100 would never negotiate,
meaning there would not be a willing licensor or willing licensee, and
the purpose of the hypothetical negotiation would be lost. On the
other hand, where proposed prices or royalties are only off by a
multiple of 2.5, it is much more believable that the parties would be
willing to negotiate and agree to a price. This comes much closer to
achieving the purpose of the hypothetical negotiation.
If the Structured Georgia Pacific Approach 152 were used instead of
this step, then the jury would still be faced with applying the Georgia
Pacific factors to a range of damages, where it is not believable that
the parties would have actually negotiated. To take Cornell as an
example, even if the $23 billion CPU brick royalty base was properly
screened out, Cornell would have still been requesting damages of
$167.5 million, which is approximately twenty-nine times greater than
the $5.7 million that HP was offering. It is likely that the
requirements of the Structured Georgia Pacific Approach would have
reduced the range of damages in Cornell noticeably below a factor of
twenty-nine, 153 but it is also unlikely that the range would have
approached a factor of 2.5. This is because the Structured Georgia
Pacific Approach—despite its increased structure—still allows the jury
to arrive at any dollar amount in between the damages presented by
the parties. With this option still on the table, the parties still have an
incentive to argue as far away as possible from their opponent,
although certainly in a more reasonable way than what currently
occurs during litigation.
In step four, the jury adjusts the chosen royalty rate starting point
from step three by using Georgia Pacific factors three through
fifteen. If the jury agrees with how the chosen party used the Georgia
Pacific factors, then no adjustment is needed. If the jury disagrees,
then they can raise or reduce the royalty rate by as much as twenty
percent of the chosen royalty rate. 154 For example, if the jury in
Cornell had chosen Cornell’s 2.5% royalty rate, then the jury would
only be able to adjust the royalty by 0.5%. This twenty percent
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limitation reflects the reality that applying the Georgia Pacific factors
to widely varying expert testimony is a confusing and imprecise
process while recognizing that the Georgia Pacific factors are still
relevant and should be permitted to have some effect on resulting
damages.
This limited uncertainty of twenty percent is much more
acceptable than the current method of just directing the jury to look
at all the evidence and the Georgia Pacific factors with no structure to
determine the reasonable royalty. 155 Retaining use of the Georgia
Pacific factors as part of the reasonable royalty determination will also
give parties the incentive to use all the relevant Georgia Pacific
factors when making their arguments to the jury. If a party fails to
discuss an unfavorable factor, then the jury may penalize them for
the omission. Further improvement to this step could be obtained by
incorporating some of the features from the Structured Georgia
Pacific Approach, such as providing clearer jury instructions that
would transform the confusing list into a series of four
straightforward questions, and requiring the use of special verdict
forms that would make the jury’s determination transparent and
allow for meaningful judicial review. 156

C. Calculating the Reasonable Running Royalty: No Lump Sums
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155. See, e.g., Final Jury Instructions, supra note 119, at 55-56 (showing that jury
instruction forty-one out of eighty-four simply lists all fifteen Georgia Pacific factors
and that instruction forty-one simply ends with “[i]t is up to you, based on the
evidence, to decide what type of royalty is appropriate in this case”). No other
direction on how to use the Georgia Pacific factors is given. Id.
156. See supra notes 124-25 and accompanying text (discussing the benefits of the
Structured Georgia Pacific Approach).
157. Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
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In step five, the jury calculates the reasonable royalty damages by
multiplying the royalty base from step one by the royalty rate from
step four. Notably, the procedure proposed here is only calculating
running royalties, and does not allow for calculating amounts that
would have been paid for a lump-sum license. Many of the reasons
for using a lump-sum license are rendered unnecessary when the
amount of infringing sales is already known. Some reasons for using
a lump-sum license include: (1) removing the patentee’s
administrative burden to monitor the use of the invention; (2)
prevent the licensee from misreporting usage of the invention; (3)
allowing the licensor to remove the risk that the licensee does not use
the invention; and (4) allowing the licensee to take the risk that the
product using the invention will be wildly successful. 157 These
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reasons are all moot by the time the infringement case appears in
court.
It is understood that the goal of the hypothetical negotiation is to
determine the license that the parties would have agreed to had they
successfully negotiated an agreement just before infringement began.
In theory, it would be nice if courts could accurately recreate every bit
of information necessary to accurately determine the license the
parties would have agreed to just before the infringement began, but
this seems to be more of a fantasy than a real possibility. 158 For the
sake of being practical and avoiding the interjection of the extra
uncertainty that a lump-sum license brings, it is recommended to
calculate the damages by applying the actual known sales of the
infringing product to a running royalty. 159 Limited exceptions to this
general rule could allow for a lump-sum calculation to be used if it is
abundantly clear that a lump-sum license would have been chosen by
both of the parties. 160

D. Adjusting the Reasonable Royalty: Incentives to License
In step six, the jury lowers damages if a non-practicing patentee
never licensed the patent and never made a good faith attempt to
license the patent. 161 If no good faith attempt was made, then the
reasonable royalty damages from step five are lowered by: (1) twentyfive percent if no such attempt is made within one year following
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158. The large ranges for damages in numerous reasonable royalty cases shows
that when the parties have the opportunity to make widely varying arguments for
damages, they will do so. See case cited supra note 6 (discussing three reasonable
royalty cases where the plaintiff and defendant were arguing for patent damages
differing by greater than $500 million). A lump-sum license offers the parties
another opportunity to make widely varying arguments while a running royalty
calculation based on actual sales removes this extra area of uncertainty.
159. There also seems to be more risk that a judicially determined lump-sum
license would be more unfair than a judicially determined running royalty. For
example, if the steps proposed by this Article are used, then the royalty base and
royalty rate should be within a reasonable range, which should result in damages that
are also within a reasonable range. On the other hand, a lump-sum damages award
would be based on the parties estimates of how many products using the invention
will be sold after the infringement begins. This estimate seems like a variable that
would be easy to manipulate. Using a judicially determined lump-sum license, it
would be possible for these sales estimates to be substantially different from the sales
that actually occurred. Also, these “pretend” estimates were likely never made before
the infringement began since the parties did not negotiate with each other.
160. For example, if both of the parties had a history of licensing almost
exclusively with lump-sum licenses, then a lump-sum license analysis could be made.
Under this approach, exclusive use of lump-sum licenses by only one of the parties
would not be sufficient.
161. If the patentee practiced the invention, then no adjustment would be made
here.
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grant of the patent; (2) fifty percent if no such attempt is made
within three years following grant of the patent; and (3) seventy-five
percent if no such attempt is made within five years following grant of
the patent. Reductions of damages under this rule are stopped as
soon as the patentee files the case claiming infringement. 162 A grant
of a patent often takes around three years. 163 If the patentee uses a
provisional application, then this time can be extended another
year. 164 This means a patentee can have roughly five years 165 to make
a good faith attempt to license the patent, so a patentee is not exactly
being rushed under this rule.
A good faith attempt is met if the patentee negotiated with a
licensee capable of producing a significant amount of product 166
containing the patented invention, and the patentee shows
documentation or the licensee testifies that the licensee was willing to
license, but that the parties could not agree on the royalty. If the
licensee cannot come within fifty percent of the rate offered by the
patentee, then such a negotiation cannot be used as evidence of a
good faith negotiation. On the other hand, if the patentee
attempted to negotiate with the alleged infringer, then the patentee
shows good faith if the rate offered by the infringer in the
negotiation or the royalty rate determined in step four is within
thirty-three percent of the rate offered by the patentee. 167
Step six reduces the incentive for a non-practicing patentee to hold
on to a patent and wait for infringement. 168 The main purpose of this

10/28/2013 10:59:23

C M
Y K

34033_amp 5-1 Sheet No. 19 Side B

162. For example, if the patentee filed for infringement 1.5 years after being
granted the patent, but the jury does not assess damages until 3.5 years after grant of
the patent, then the jury looks at the 1.5 years and only reduces damages by twentyfive percent if no good faith attempt to license was made.
163. See U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, Performance and Accountability
Report Fiscal Year 2011 14 (2011) available at http://www.uspto.gov/about/
stratplan/ar/index.jsp (noting that the average pendency of patent applications at
the USPTO was 33.7 months in fiscal 2011).
164. See 35 U.S.C. § 119(e)(1) (2006).
165. It is five years because there is three years for the approximate average time it
takes to grant a patent plus one for the provisional application, plus one for the one
year after the grant of the patent before the adjustment under this rule takes effect.
166. A significant amount could be an amount necessary to serve ten percent of
the U.S. national market for that product.
167. The patentee has a lower bar here to make it riskier for infringers to refuse to
negotiate. Setting the numbers at fifty percent and thirty-three percent are only a
starting point and other percentages may ultimately strike a better balance.
168. Non-practicing patentees often wait many years to file infringement suits.
See Michael Risch, Patent Troll Myths, 20 SETON HALL L. REV. 457, 490-91 (2012)
(noting in a study of highly litigious non-practicing entities (NPE) that the average
time a NPE waited before filing infringement was 8.3 years, but also noting that a
good portion of this delay appeared to be due to the inventor/initial assignee and
not necessarily due to the NPEs studied in the analysis). Possibly some of the NPEs
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step is to encourage a non-practicing patentee to license their patents
for two reasons. 169 First, the government grants patents to encourage
innovation. 170 Innovation should be encouraged so that new and
useful products are brought to the marketplace to enhance the lives
of the public. 171 Innovation should not be encouraged for the
purpose of allowing patent trolls to hide until they see an opportunity
to sue for highly unpredictable infringement damages. Currently,
our patent system has created a situation where non-practicing
patentees, including patent trolls, have been able to obtain twice the
amount of damages than their practicing counterparts. 172 Thus, our
patent system encourages those who are not bringing products to
market more than those who are bringing new products to the
market. This frustrates the goal of patent law. Step six counteracts
this disparity and makes it significantly more risky for the nonpracticing patentee to simply hold onto the patent and wait for
infringement.
The second reason to encourage licensing is so that a royalty rate
from a real negotiation could be used if an infringement case arises.
Once non-practicing patentees see that it is risky to simply hold onto
their patents without licensing, these patentees will make more of an
effort to license their patents. If the patentee succeeds in licensing,
then this rate will be some of the strongest evidence of the royalty
rate at which the infringer would have licensed the invention. If the
patentee fails to license the invention, but makes a good faith attempt
to license the patent, then this is still strong evidence of the royalty at
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made a good faith effort to license, but many probably did not, so a stronger
incentive to license is needed.
169. It is unlikely that this step would encourage many patentees to start
practicing the patent themselves. For example, most university professors who
obtain patents prefer to continue their research as opposed to quitting their jobs to
start a company. Similarly, a patent troll does not have any intention to bring
products to market through practicing or licensing. Tina M. Nguyen, Lowering the
Fare: Reducing the Patent Troll’s Ability to Tax the Patent System, 22 FED. CIRCUIT
B.J. 101, 105 (2012).
170. The U.S. Constitution encourages innovation by promoting “the progress of
science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the
exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.
8.
171. See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 150-51
(1989) (“The federal patent system thus embodies a carefully crafted bargain for
encouraging the creation and disclosure of new, useful, and nonobvious advances in
technology and design in return for the exclusive right to practice the invention for a
period of years.”) (emphasis added).
172. See Levko et al., supra note 20, 5 (noting how damage awards for nonpracticing entities have been more than double the damages awarded to practicing
entities since 1995).
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CONCLUSION
Ultimately, the structured approach proposed here would need to
be legislatively enacted. Notably, the recently enacted America
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173. See 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006) (allowing the court to assess damages of up to
three times the amount found).
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which the infringer may have licensed the patent. Presumably, the
infringer would have also determined the patentee’s price was too
high, but it is likely that the parties who failed to reach an agreement
were negotiating somewhere in the range of a reasonable royalty, and
not separated by a factor 100 as was the case in Cornell.
Another benefit of step six is that regardless of when the nonpracticing/non-licensing patentee addresses the infringement, step
six reduces the amount of damages this patentee can demand. If this
non-practicing/non-licensing patentee addresses the infringement
within one year of receiving the patent, then step six does not reduce
the royalty rate or royalty base, but the total amount of damages is
reduced because fewer infringing products will have been sold. On
the other hand, if the patentee makes no attempt for five years, then
step six drastically cuts the damages by seventy-five percent. This
reduces the ultimate range of damages at trial under either scenario
and in many cases may prevent trial. For example, after five years,
the patentee’s proposed damages would need to be well over four
times the defendant’s proposed damages because four (i.e., the
patentee’s proposed damages) reduced by seventy-five percent (i.e.,
the defendant’s proposed damages) is one. It is also noteworthy that
if the infringement begins five years after the grant of the patent and
the non-practicing patentee, who made no attempt to license, files
immediately, the damages are still cut by seventy-five percent. If the
damages were not cut until infringement began, certain patent trolls
would still take the risk to wait for infringement. Again, waiting for
infringement is not the goal of our patent system.
Some might argue that step six encourages infringement, but the
infringer will still be taking a significant risk by deliberately
infringing. First, the infringer would have no idea whether or not the
patentee ever made a good faith attempt to license the patent. If the
patentee did make a good faith attempt, the damages would not be
reduced at all. Furthermore, the jury could still determine that the
defendant willfully infringed, which creates a risk of treble
damages. 173
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174. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011).
175. See Joe Matal, A Guide to the Legislative History of the America Invents Act:
Part I of II, 21 FED. CIRCUIT B.J. 435, 439, 445 (2011) (noting that although earlier
versions of the America Invents Act (AIA) contained provisions reforming
reasonable royalty determinations, amendments to the AIA made in March of 2011
removed the last provisions that would affect the award of damages).
176. See Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1310 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
(stating broadly that the method of computing patent damages is within the
discretion of the court).
177. See Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
(rejecting use of the twenty-five percent rule because this rule of thumb fails to
associate royalty rates used in prior licenses to the particular hypothetical negotiation
at issue).
178. See supra Part IV.B (explaining how the range of damages in Cornell would
have been $67 million to $167.5 million if steps one through three of the proposed
steps were applied).
179. See supra Part II.B-C (showing the original arguments for damages offered by
HP and Cornell).
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Invents Act 174 did not make any changes to how reasonably royalties
are calculated. 175 Legislative enactment would overrule the vast
discretion courts currently have to hear any method to determine
reasonable royalty damages. 176 Legislative enactment would also
obviate the need for courts to strike down illogical rules one at a
time, such as how the twenty-five percent rule was recently struck
down in Uniloc. 177
As discussed above, if steps one through five of the proposed rules
were applied to the Cornell case, the plaintiff could have at most
argued for damages that were 2.5 times the damages of the
defendant. 178 This is an enormous improvement over the actual
litigation, where the plaintiff argued for damages that were 100 times
greater than the damages argued by the defendant. 179 This reduction
by a factor of forty was accomplished with two simple rules. First,
patentees can only argue for application of the EMVR if they have
strong supporting evidence, such as surveys. Second, the jury is
required to pick the most reasonable royalty rate offered by the
parties. This step accepts the reality that patents are difficult to value
and that an incentive to make reasonable arguments for reasonable
royalty damages is needed to prevent the parties from making the
most widely varying arguments possible. Additionally, if Cornell had
not licensed the patent, then the range of damages would have been
reduced even further in step six. This last step discourages nonpracticing patentees from choosing to wait for infringement instead
of attempting to license their patents. This final step also helps to
align the laws for determining reasonable royalty damages with the
overall policy of patent law, which is to encourage innovation in
order to bring innovations to the public. With these six steps, the
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highly unpredictable process of determining a reasonable royalty can
be replaced with a new structured approach that can actually produce
a royalty that is reasonable.
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